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SUMMARIES 
Throughout the 18th century, the notion of proba- 
bilistic expectation was a matter of controversy among 
mathematicians. Despite its seminal role in the ear- 
liest formulations of mathematical probability, such 
as that of Huygens, expectation did not remain a fixed 
concept but underwent several striking shifts in defi- 
nition. This paper argues that the conception of ex- 
pectation was altered by mathematicians in a deliberate 
effort to capture the salient aspects of rational de- 
cision making. As the notion of rationality succes- 
sively took on legal, economic, and then psychological 
overtones, the definition of probabilistic expectation 
followed suit. 
Tout au long du 18i&me si&cle, la notion d'esp&- 
ante mathgmatique a &t& un sujet de controverse parmi 
les mathgmaticiens. Malgr6 son importance creatrice 
dans les premieres formulations d'une thgorie des 
probabilit&s, telle que celle de Huygens, le concept 
d'esp&-ante ne demeura pas stagnant, sa definition 
subit de nombreux changements remarquables. Dans le 
p&sent article, nous tentons de montrer que les math& 
maticiens modifierent d&ib&r&ment le concept d'esp&r- 
ante en vue d'isoler les points saillants d'un processus 
rationel de prise de dgcision. De m$me que la notion 
de rationalit& prit successivement une teinte lggale, 
Bconomique puis psychologique, de mgme en a-t-i1 && 
ainsi de la dgfinition d'esp&rance mathgmatique. 
Das ganze 18. Jahrhundert hindurch herrschten 
kontroverse Auffassungen bei den Mathematikern iiber 
den Erwartungsbegriff in der Wahrscheinlichkeits- 
rechnung. Trotz der fruchtbaren Rolle, die der 
Erwartungsbegriff in den friihesten Formulierungen der 
mathematischen Wahrscheinlichkeit wie z.B. derjenigen 
von Huygens spielte, wurde er nicht unver;indert bei- 
behalten, sondern erfuhr mehrere entscheidende Defi- 
nitionsveranderungen. In dieser Abhandlung wird aus- 
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gefiihrt, dass der Begriff der Erwartung von den Mathe- 
matikern umdefiniert wurde im bewussten Streben danach, 
die wesentlichen Aspekte rationaler Entscheidungen 
einzubeziehen. Die Definition des Erwartungswertes 
der Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung folgte der allgemeinen 
Entwickfung, in der der RationalitFitsbegriff der Reihe 
nach legalistische, okonomische und schliesslich psy- 
chologische Ziige erkennen liess. 
The ideal of rational conduct in the social sphere is a 
venerable one, as Aristotle's inquiry into the "rational princi- 
ple" which guides the virtuous bears witness. In his discussion 
of social rationality in the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle sets 
forth two precepts which Enlightenment mathematicians challenged 
with the help of probability theory: first, that such practical 
sciences were by their nature not susceptible to the same pre- 
cision enjoyed by mathematics--"for demanding logical demon- 
strations from a teacher of rhetoric is clearly about as reason- 
able as accepting mere plausibility from a mathematician"--and 
that, by implication, they were therefore not amenable to mathe- 
matical treatment; and second, that practical sciences could not 
even aspire to the status of an art having codified rules, since 
particular circumstances preponderated in every human decision 
[Aristotle 1976, 651. In this paper, I will discuss the attempts 
of Enlightenment mathematicians to create a mathematical treat- 
ment of social rationality, or "reasonableness," which would 
serve as the basis of the sciences of man and society by render- 
ing explicit the rules underlying reasonableness and reducing 
these to a calculus--the calculus of probabilities. My argu- 
ment will consist of several parts: first, an account of how 
mathematical probability came to be linked to the problem of 
social rationality through the concept of expectation; second, 
an explanation of how the 18th-century conception of "mixed 
mathematics" obliged probabilists to tailor, and occasionally 
modify, their theory to the specifications of contemporary social 
and political thought; and finally, specific examples of how 
mathematicians sought to keep pace with changing notions of 
social rationality with successive redefinitions of probabilistic 
expectation. 
Only with the advent of a new model of explanation for the 
social sciences which emphasized social regularities rather than 
individual rationality, coupled with recognition of the independ- 
ence of mathematical probability from its applications, did prob- 
abilistic expectation cease to be a matter of mathematical con- 
troversy. My aim is not only to explain the at first glance 
surprising relationship between mathematical probability and the 
moral sciences, as they were known in 18th-century parlance, but 
also to shed some light on the problem of applying mathematics 
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to experience as it was conceived by practitioners of mixed mathe- 
matics during this period. Taking the protracted debate over the 
key concept of probabilistic expectation as my text, I will argue 
that social theory supplied definitions and even criteria for 
acceptable solutions to probability theory during this period. 
Although most versions of mathematical probability derive 
the concept of expectation from that of probability, the first 
published expositions of the theory presented a calculus of ex- 
pectations rather than one of probabilities. Pascal and Fermat 
invented mathematical probability in a 1654 exchange of letters 
sparked by the Problem of Points, a classical problem in determin- 
ing expectation [Pascal 1970 2, 1132-11581. However, the corre- 
spondence was not published until 1679, and in the interim 
Christian Huygens became acquainted with the results (but not the 
content) of the exchange during his 1655 visit to Paris [Brugmans 
1935, 401, and reconstructed the mathematical treatment of chance 
in a brief Latin treatise later translated into Dutch, French, and 
English, the Tractatus de rationciniis in aleae ludo (1657). 
Huygens' treatise was not only the first published work on mathe- 
matical probability; it was also the first to organize the theory 
into a system of definitions, postulates, and propositions. His 
approach dominated the subject until the posthumous publication 
of Jacques Bernoulli's Ars conjectandi in 1713, and even Bernoulli's 
work took Huygens' treatise as its departure point, reprinting it 
with commentary as Book I of Bernoulli's more comprehensive treat- 
ment of the subject. Huygens' influence on classical probability 
theory was therefore both seminal and enduring, and his approach 
can legitimately be taken as characteristic of that school. 
Huygens' treatise set forth, strictly speaking, a calculus 
of expectations rather than of probabilities. Huygens posed 
problems on the fair division of stakes or the "reasonable" price 
for a player's place in an ongoing game, rather than questions 
about the probabilities of the events themselves. Considered by 
itself, Huygens' fundamental principle--his definition of ex- 
pectation--sounds suspiciously circular: 
One's Hazard or Expectation to gain any Thing is worth 
so much, as, if he had it, he could purchase the like 
Hazard or Expectation again in a just and equal Game. 
[Huygens 1770 2, 263; Huygens 1920 14, 60-611 
Since later probabilists defined an equal or- fair game as one in 
which the players' expectations equaled the price of playing 
the game (i.e., the stake), Huygens' explanation of a fair game 
seems to lead nowhere. However, Huygens here assumed that the 
notion of an equal game was a self-evident one for his readers. 
The alternative definition, which gained currency in the 18th 
century, derived expectation and the criterion for a fair game 
from the definition of probability, expressed as the ratio of 
the number of combinations favorable to the event to the total 
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number of combinations. This route remained closed to Huygens. 
Instead, he appealed to an intuitive-- or at least nonmathematical-- 
notion of equity; in this case, the equitable exchange of ex- 
pectations and the conditions for a fair game. 
Why did Huygens and the first generation of mathematical 
probabilists choose expectation rather than probability proper 
as the foundation for their theory? In part because readers 
could be presumed familiar withthe qualitative legal analog of 
expectation. Several historians have remarked the curious 
coincidence of early probability theory and jurisprudence in the 
minds of late-17th- and early 18th-century mathematicians, par- 
ticularly in Leibniz' comments on the theory [Hacking 1975, Chap. 
101. Alexander Koyrg suggested in passing that the true originality 
of the Pascal/Fermat correspondence lay not in its combinatorial 
aspects, which had been anticipated by Galileo and others, but 
in its conceptualization of the problem in legal terms: "the 
question of the right of the player to the stake" [Koyrd 1956, 
2911. Ernst Coumet has pursued Koyre's insight back to the body 
of law which grew up around the attempts of 16th- and 17th-century 
jurists and theologians to exempt the commercial practices of 
collecting interest from investments from the traditional religious 
strictures against usury [Coumet 1970, 574-5981. 
However, these treatments have restricted the influence of 
legal thought on mathematical probability to the early, fluid 
stages of the theory, before its definitions and techniques were 
fully articulated in mathematical form. Yet, far from being 
confined to the prehistory of the theory or to "eccentric" versions 
(such as that of Leibniz), the influence of legal ideas on prob- 
ability theory persisted throughout the 18th century. Although 
legal influences shaped several aspects of mathematical prob- 
ability and its applications during this period, their impact was 
particularly marked in discussions of probabilistic expectation. 
Mathematicians viewed expectation in two ways, both inherited 
from older, nonmathematical contexts. Expectation might denote 
a set of rules either for determining the fairness of an agree- 
ment involving uncertainty or for assessing the advisability of 
participating in a risky venture. The one balanced the trade of 
a certain sum against the possibility of gain or loss for all 
parties in, for example, a game of chance or the sale of an in- 
surance policy. The other weighed individual possibilities for 
profit or loss with an eye toward securing an advantage, as in a 
commercial investment. These two perspectives of equity and 
prudence ultimately led probabilists to conflicting formulations 
of expectation, both of which linked mathematical probability 
theory to the moral sciences and the quest for a standard of 
reasonableness. 
These rival interpretations of expectation stemmed from 
different pre-probabilistic contexts. Expectation, understood 
qualitatively, antedated the mathematical treatment of prob- 
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ability in at least one learned discipline. Within the body of 
Roman-canonical law which dominated continental jurisprudence, 
aleatory contracts were long a recognized subdivision of contract 
law. Aleatory contracts included all agreements involving an 
element of chance: games of chance, annuities, partnerships in 
which one party supplied the capital and another assumed the 
burden of the risk for the venture, maritime insurance, prior 
purchase of the "cast of a net" from a fisherman, etc. As Coumet 
has shown, this type of contract attracted much attention from 
16th- and 17th-century mercantile apologists who hoped to class 
loans with interest and other apparently usurious practices under 
this more innocuous heading within the law. 
As in all contract law of the period, jurists were primarily 
concerned with stipulating the conditions of equity between part- 
ners to such aleatory contracts. Contracts, according to the 
famous 17th-century jurist Grotius, "were intended to promote a 
beneficial intercourse among mankind" and therefore presumed 
equality of terms [Grotius 1901, 1471. Equal expectations, 
rather than equal probabilities of gain or loss, generally 
assured an equitable contract, although some jurists also in- 
sisted upon an equality among partners, particularly in com- 
mercial ventures [Grimaudet 1583, 911. But most were willing 
to accept an agreement in which one party bought, for example, 
a prospect with only a slim probability of coming to pass for 
a substantial price, if the value of the prospect were high 
enough. Nicholas Bernoulli summarized the conventional doctrine 
of legal expectation as consisting "in the right of gaining and 
having that which will be taken. Thus, the buyer cannot complain 
of injury if nothing should be taken, since from the beginning 
gain and loss are quite evenly balanced against one another" 
[N. Bernoulli 1976, 261. Jean Domat explained the legal argument 
underlying expectation in Les lois civiles dans leur or&-e nature1 
(1689-1694): 
And these Kinds of Convenants have their Justice 
founded upon this, that one Party prefers a Certainty, 
whether of Profit or Loss, to an uncertain Expectation 
of Events.... Thus there is made up between them a 
Sort of Equality in their Bargains, which renders 
their Agreement just. [Domat 1737, 481, [l] 
It is significant that the earliest expositions of mathematical 
probability, as well as the problems addressed by its practi- 
tioners, were all couched in terms of expectation, and of ex- 
pectation conceived as equity. Games of chance were included 
among aleatory contracts, and the Problem of Points which prompted 
the Pascal/Fermat correspondence was a typical problem in legal 
expectation: how to divide the stakes of an unfinished game 
fairly. The determination of the just stake in a game of chance 
was another. Huyqens' above-quoted definition of expectation 
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was cast in terms of a fair trade or contract: equal expecta- 
tions were those which could be exchanged for one another "in a 
just and equal game." Several of Huygens' demonstrations hinge 
on an intuitive understanding of an equitable contract. In order 
to prove expectations equal, Huygens posited a series of "equit- 
able" trades among players. Later probabilists define expecta- 
tion in terms of probabilities; Huygens derived probabilities 
(implicitly) from expectations. Chances are equiprobable because 
the game is assumed fair. Jean De Witt, trained in both law 
and mathematics, followed Huygens' reasoning closely in his 
Treatise on Life Annuities (1671): "I presuppose that the real 
value of certain expectations or chances of objects, of different 
value, must be estimated by that which we can obtain from equal 
expectations or chances, dependent on one or several equal con- 
tracts" [De Witt 1856, 82-831. Without some prior method of 
assessing equal contracts, De Witt's demonstrations, like Huygens', 
collapse into tautologies. 
Expectation-based treatments soon gave way to more genuinely 
probabilistic ones. By 1709, Nicholas Bernoulli could reproach 
his fellow jurists for their imprecise understanding of expecta- 
tion, holding up the mathematical "art of conjecture" as a surer 
guide to equity in aleatory contracts, particularly annuities 
[N. Bernoulli 1976, 301. Probabilistic expectation defined the 
terms for an equitable contract, rather than the reverse, in this 
new scheme. However, Nicholas Bernoulli upheld the older identifica 
tion of equal expectation with equitable contracts and exchanges; 
he simply proposed to substitute computation for more intuitive 
reasoning. For continental probabilists, expectation retained 
its legal overtones of equity until the end of the 18th century. 
By associating expectation with contractual equity, Huygens 
and his fellow probabilists forged one link between mathematical 
probability and the moral sciences. Contracts were the backbone 
of the natural law school of jurisprudence of the late 16th and 
17th centuries, and were extended by 17th-century political and 
social theorists like Grotius, Hobbes, Pufendorf, and Locke to 
explain the origins of social bonds, the sovereign's title to 
legitimacy, and the relationships among nations in peace and at 
war. Contracts became the paradigm for all social relationships, 
be they among individuals, ruler and subjects, or nations. In- 
sofar as equity among contracting parties validated all such 
agreements as binding, the equitable connotations of probabilistic 
expectation--Pascal described his g&ometrie du hasard as a mathe- 
matical means of determining equity under conditions of un- 
certainty [Pascal 1970 1, 33-37]--bound mathematical probability 
to one important school of social and political thought. 
A second, distinct connotation of expectation also connected 
mathematical probability to another key concern of the Enlighten- 
ment moral sciences, this time the economic theory of value and 
prudent conduct in the marketplace. 
240 Lorraine J. Daston HM7 
Expectation and prudence came to be linked in late-17th- 
century philosophical and religious discussions of rational 
belief. Skeptical attacks on the rationalist ideal of certain, 
demonstrative knowledge had made considerable headway in philo- 
sophical circles, and the new model of empirical, tentative 
proof exemplified by Newton's celebrated methodological reflec- 
tions in the General Scholium had further weakened the deductive 
program for science. Many echoed Locke's contention that the 
majority of human decisions must be made in the "twilight of 
probabilities" rather than in the noonday glare of certainty, 
but hoped to steer a middle course between the nihilism of the 
Pyrrhonists and the rigidity of the Schools and their rationalist 
successors. Prominent among these moderates were the so-called 
Royal Society theologians: Boyle, Wilkins, Glanvill et al. [2]. 
While conceding that mathematical or "metaphysical" certainty 
might be beyond the grasp of merely human intellect without the 
aid of revelation, these apologists nonetheless maintained that 
rational belief--religious, scientific, or other--was justified 
because daily life would be unthinkable without it. Belief, they 
contended, was practical and active as well as intellectual and 
contemplative. By this pragmatic criterion, even the most con- 
firmed skeptics suspended their disbelief in the existence of an 
external world long enough to take meals, thus betraying in their 
actions a stubborn will to believe which belied their professed 
philosophical doubts. In this vein, Boyle observed that although 
moral demonstrations based on a "concurrence of probabilities" 
could not lay claim to metaphysical or even physical certainty, 
they were still "the surest guide, which the actions of men, 
though not their contemplations, have regularly allowed them to 
follow" [Boyle 1772 4, 1821. 
The apologists took this "practical reason" of everyday life 
to be their standard: we are obliged to believe whatever is 
sufficiently probable--whether it is the law of gravitation, the 
existence of God, or the permanence of taxes--as to persuade a 
reasonable man to take action in the ordinary course of his daily 
affairs. By "probable," the apologists generally meant "highest 
expectation." The actual probability of God's existence, or the 
success of a voyage to the East Indies, must be weighed against 
the magnitude of the possible gain. Pascal's wager was the para- 
digm case for such reasoning by expectation, and enjoyed wide 
currency both in France and England during the latter half of the 
17th century. John Tillotson's version of the wager was among 
the earliest (in fact, his sermon on the subject was delivered 
five years before the publication of the first edition of Pascal's 
Pen&es in 1669): 
so that, if the arguments for and against a God 
were equal, and it were an even question, Whether 
there were one or not? yet the hazard and danger is 
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so infinitely unequal, that in point of prudence and 
interest every man were obliged to incline to the 
affirmative; and, whatever doubts he might have about 
it, to chuse [sic] the safest side of the question, and 
to make that the principle to live by. For he that 
acts wisely, and is a thoroughly prudent man, will be 
provided against all events, and will take care to 
secure the main chance whatever happens. [Tillotson 
1748 1, 40-411 
Tillotson's "thoroughly prudent man" made appearances in 
many similar tracts. Wilkins advertised his defense of natural 
religion as "sufficient to convince any man, who hath but an 
ordinary capacity and an honest mind" adequate to the task of 
managing his personal affairs competently. Wilkins urged that 
if "the most wise and most honest men" were persuaded that a 
venture was probable, "he that would act rationally, according 
to such Rules and Principles as all mankind do observe in the 
government of their Actions, must be persuaded to do the like" 
[Wilkins 1699, 15-161. Boyle claimed that the "dictates of 
prudence" endorsed reasoning by expectation: all reasonable 
men would concur that it was best to sacrifice a gangrene-in- 
fected limb in the hopes of saving a life; to submit to unproven 
remedies for smallpox and other dread diseases when stricken; to 
invest in a risky cormnercial venture with a huge prospect of 
gain [Boyle 1772 4, 184-1861. The influential Port Royal Logique, 
ou 1'Art de penser (1662) exhorted its readers to not only "con- 
sider the good or the evil in itself, but also the probability 
that it will or will not occur, and to consider the proportion 
which all of these things have together mathematically" in the 
hopes of "rendering us more reasonable in our hopes and fears" 
[Arnauld and Nicole 1965, 353, 3541. 
This last formulation of reasoning by expectation was ex- 
plicitly mathematical, and may well have been written under 
Pascal's supervision. Mathematical probability thus incorporated 
the prudential sense of expectation, as well as the legal con- 
notations of equity. In the context of prudent action, expecta- 
tion suggested advantageous rather than equitable exchanges, as 
the recurring example of profitable commercial investments made 
clear. In the first French and English editions of Pascal's 
posthumous Pen&es, the section which set forth the wager was 
titled "That it is more advantageous to believe, than not to be- 
lieve what is taught by the Christian Religion" [Pascal 1688, 
Sect. VII]. Both senses of expectation appealed to familiar 
notions--the fair deal and the profitable one--and thus cemented 
the connection between mathematical probability and good sense. 
Prudential expectation meshed smoothly with the late-17th- 
century campaign to subordinate the more volatile "passions" of 
ambition and lust to the more orderly "interests." Originally 
242 Lorraine J. Daston HM7 
the term "interests" carried moral overtones fully as reprehen- 
sible as those which disparaged the passions and spanned a 
variety of motives, including the desire for honor and glory as 
well as wealth. In the 17th century, however, the traditional 
Christian critique of both the passions and the interests as 
inimical to virtue changed in two important ways: first, the 
interests took on a comparatively more benign moral tone, in 
large part because they seemed to be the most effective means 
of subduing the more socially disruptive passions; and second, 
the original spread of varied interests narrowed to a single 
focus, the interest in economic gain. As a consequence (and 
perhaps also as a cause) of the latter transformation of the 
notion of interest in 17th-century political theory, emphasis 
on calculating the long-term economic results of alternative 
courses of action, many if not most of which involved some 
measure of uncertainty, grew steadily. Probabilistic expectation, 
once freed of its original associations with equity, offered a 
ready means of computing and comparing economic advantage [Hirsch- 
man 1977, 48-661. 
These two conceptions of expectation, the one equitable and 
the other prudential, colored mathematical views throughout the 
18th century. The one balanced the trade of a certain sum against 
the possibility of gain or loss, in, for example, a fair lottery. 
The other weighed individual possibilities for profit or loss 
with an eye toward securing an advantage, as in a commercial 
investment. Probabilists attempted to cast both aspects of 
expectation into mathematical terms, as will be seen below, and 
sought to justify their rival formulations by an appeal to the 
opinions and conduct of a hypothetical "reasonable man." 
Throughout these defenses of rational belief in the face of 
inevitable uncertainty, the notion of the "reasonable man" who 
comports himself sensibly in mundane matters is left undefined. 
His judgment is made the measure of all belief, but the validity 
and pronouncements of that judgment are accepted as irreducible 
data. For 18th-century proponents of reasoning by expectation, 
the fundamental problem was deriving and comparing degrees of 
probability for scientific theories, natural theology, judicial 
error, etc., to the accepted uncertainties of daily life such as, 
in Condorcet's example, the small risks of traveling by the Dover- 
Calais packetboat. The meaning of "reasonable conduct" was 
assumed to be self-evident and universal, the fixed standard for 
all other decisions in uncertain circumstances. Expectation, 
and with it the calculus of probabilities, became bound up with 
common, albeit equivocal, reason. Laplace concluded his Essai 
philosophique sur les probabilitk (1814) by underscoring this 
connection: 
It is seen in this essay that the theory of prob- 
abilities is at bottom only common sense reduced to 
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calculus; it makes us appreciate with exactitude that 
which exact minds feel by a sort of instinct without 
being able ofttimes to give a reason for it. [Laplace 
1951, 1961 
The 18th-century conception of mixed mathematics reinforced 
the bond between mathematical probability and the several shades 
of reasonableness articulated by the moral sciences. D'Alembert's 
Preliminary Discourse to the Encyclopedic ends with the best 
approximation we have to a map of the intellectual terrain of the 
Enlightenment, set out as a chart entitled "Detailed System of 
Human Knowledge." Mathematical probability--termed the "art of 
conjecture" after Jacques Bernoulli's treatise--falls under the 
subheading of "mixed mathematics" with which "pure mathematics" 
comprises the category of mathematics, the whole of which is 
complemented by "particular physics" to round out the major 
rubric of the "science of nature." In addition to the mathema- 
tical art of conjecture, mixed mathematics also embraced mechanics, 
acoustics, optics, pneumatics, and "geometric astronomy," and 
strikes the modern eye as a conglomeration of applied mathematics 
and mathematical physics, in contrast to the "particular physics" 
of zoology, medicine, meteorology, botany, and chemistry. The 
category of mixed mathematics dwarfs that of pure mathematics 
(constituted by arithmetic--including analysis--and geometry) 
and potentially encompassed all of the exact sciences [D'Alembert 
1963, 144-145; 153-1541. 
We must be wary of identifying 18th-century mixed mathematics 
too glibly with our latter-day category of applied mathematics, 
despite obvious similarities. Applied mathematics implies an 
opposition with pure mathematics, with priority granted to the 
latter. To postformalist ways of thinking this priority is 
logical, if not always historical, and the very possibility of 
successfully applying what Einstein once described as "free 
creations of the mind" to the external world is a perpetual 
miracle; a kind of Leibnizian prearranged harmony between mind 
and matter. Eighteenth-century mathematicians saw no need to 
resort to such occasionalism to explain the fit between mathe- 
matics and phenomena, for they conceived of pure and mixed 
mathematics as contiguous regions along a spectrum of empirically 
derived sciences. Pure mathematics represented an extreme pole 
of abstraction from physical experience, and thus constituted 
the most fundamental (and the simplest) of the empirical sciences. 
Pure mathematics treated a schematic rendering of the phenomena, 
shorn of all features except magnitude and extension. Eighteenth- 
century mathematicians viewed mixed mathematics as an inter- 
mediate point between the pared-down entities of pure mathematics 
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and the complex detail of actual sensory experience, supplying 
quantitative treatments of other aspects of experience in addi- 
tion to magnitude and extension. Mechanics, for example, was 
the quantitative study of extension, magnitude, and motion. 
As a branch of the science of nature, mixed mathematics was 
a collection of theories about various phenomena. Unlike the 
theories of particular physics such as those of medicine or 
meteorology, these theories were expressly quantitative. However, 
both mathematical and physical theories shared an obligation to 
describe phenomena accurately. In essence, the branches of 18th- 
century mixed mathematics correspond to what would now be termed 
mathematical models. If the mathematical description diverged 
significantly from the phenomena, it was incumbent upon the 
mixed mathematician to revise his theory. In other words, mathe- 
matical probability was as "corrigible" as the mathematical theory 
of lunar motion. The mathematical techniques were not independent 
of their applications, far less prior to them. Thus the designated 
field of applications played a critical role in the career of a 
branch of mixed mathematics, and such indeed was the case in 
mathematical probability. 
The distinctive field of applications to which classical 
probabilists attached their theory may be divided into three 
parts: the mathematical analysis of games of chance, the ex- 
tension of the theory of actuarial and physical problems, and 
the study of "civil society." The unfinished fourth book of 
Jacques Bernoulli's Ars conjectandi pioneered this last applica- 
tion, and his 18th-century successors, including Condorcet, Laplace, 
and his nephews Nicholas and Daniel Bernoulli, attempted to en- 
large the domain of probability theory further into the moral 
sciences. It was in this context that the controversy over 
probabilistic expectation arose. Given the mixed mathematician's 
aim of achieving a near-congruence between mathematical treat- 
ment and subject matter, it is not surprising that mathematicians 
should have imported the objectives and concepts of the moral 
sciences into probability theory. In particular, probabilists 
adopted the individualistic, prescriptive stance of the Enlight- 
enment moral sciences which undertook to establish standards for 
rational thought and conduct in the social realm [Daston 19801. 
By isolating and mathematizing the principles which underlay 
the beliefs and actions of an elite of reasonable men, the prob- 
abilists hoped to make social rationality accessible to all. 
Since probability theory was meant to be a mathematical model 
of reasonableness, when its results clashed with the judgments 
of hommes &lair&, probabilists anxiously reexamined their 
premises and demonstrations for inconsistencies. 
This is why the St. Petersburg paradox, trivial in itself, 
triggered an animated debate over the foundations of probability 
theory. Unlike most mathematical paradoxes, the contradiction 
lay not between discrepant mathematical results reached by 
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methods of apparently equal validity, but rather between the un- 
ambiguous mathematical solution and good sense. The problem, 
first proposed by Nicholas Bernoulli in a letter to Pierre Montmort 
and published in the second edition of the latter's Essai d'analyse 
sur les jeux de hazard (1713), belonged to the staple category 
of expectation problems [Todhunter 1865, 133-1341. Two players, 
A and B, play a coin-toss game. If the coin turns up heads on 
the first toss, B gives A one ducat; if heads does not turn up 
until the second toss, B pays two ducats, and so on, such that 
if heads does not occur until the nth toss, A wins 2"-1 ducats. 
Figured according to the standard definition of expectation, 
A's expectation is infinite, for there is a finite, though 
vanishingly small, probability that even a fair coin will produce 
an unbroken string of tails. Therefore, A must pay B an infinite 
amount to play the game: 
E = (l/2)(1) + (l/4)(2) + (l/8) (4) + -'* + (l/2n) (2n-1) + l * **  
However, as Nicholas Bernoulli and subsequent commentators 
were quick to point out, no reasonable man would pay even a 
small amount, must less a very large or infinite sum, for the 
privilege of playing such a game. The results of the standard 
mathematical analysis clearly affronted common sense; hence the 
"paradox." The divergent solutions to this dilemma proposed by 
18th-century probabilists reflected the tension between the 
equitable and prudential connotations of expectaion. 
In 1738, Daniel Bernoulli, cousin of Nicholas, published a 
resolution of the paradox in the annals of the Academy of St. 
Petersburg. Historians of economic theory regard this memoir 
as the earliest expression of the concept of economic utility, 
but Bernoulli and his colleagues considered the memoir to be 
an important contribution to the mathematical theory of prob- 
ability. Bernoulli's analysis did more than rechristen the 
problem in honor of the Academy; it also set the acceptable 
terms of solution for his successors. Although other mathe- 
maticians challenged the specifics of Bernoulli's approach, all 
agreed that the paradox was a real one which threatened to under- 
mine the calculus of probabilities at its foundations, that the 
definition of expectation was the nub of the problem, and that 
a satisfactory solution must realign the mathematical theory with 
the opinions of reasonable men. 
Bernoulli's strategy was to distinguish two senses of ex- 
pectation, one "mathematical" and the other "moral." Mathematical 
expectation corresponded to the classical definition of expecta- 
tion, as the product of the probability and value of each possible 
gain or loss. Bernoulli's discussion of this type of expectation 
was thoroughly legal in tone. He observed that the standard 
definition ignored the individual characteristics of the risk takers 
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in question, and that it was premised on the equitable assumption 
that all those encountering identical risks deserved equal pro- 
spects of having their "desires more closely fulfilled" [D. Bern- 
oulli 1954, 241. Bernoulli thus linked "mathematical" expecta- 
tion with the legal context of aleatory contracts, balancing un- 
certain expectations against an immediate and certain amount. 
Mathematical expectation quantified the jurist's intuitive "Sort 
of Equality" obtaining among parties to such contracts, but 
retained the vocabulary and aims of legal equity. 
Bernoulli proposed to shift the perspective in his treatment 
of the St. Petersburg problem from that of a "judgment" of equity 
pronounced "by the highest judge established by public authority" 
to one of 'deliberation' by an individual contemplating a risk 
according to his "specific financial circumstances." Once the 
concept of expectation was transplanted from a legal to an 
economic framework, the classical definition lost its relevance. 
Whereas mathematical expectation had been purposefully defined 
to exclude personal circumstances which might prejudice the 
judicial assumption of the equal rights of contracting parties, 
fiscal prudence required some consideration of just such specifics. 
Bernoulli argued that the plight of a poor man holding a lottery 
ticket with a l/2 probability of winning 20,000 ducats was in no 
way symmetric to that of a rich man in the same position: the 
poor man would be foolish not to sell his ticket for 9000 ducats, 
although his mathematical expectation was 10,000; the rich man 
would be ill-advised not to buy it for the same amount. 
Bernoulli maintained that a new sort of "moral" expectation 
must be applied to such cases in order to bring the notion of 
value (i.e., the measure of possible gain or loss) into line 
with common belief and prudent practice. Mathematical expecta- 
tion quite rightly equated outcome value with price, a method 
well suited to civil ajudication because it is intrinsic to the 
object and uniform for everyone. Moral expectation, in contrast, 
based value on the "utility"--or "the power of,a thing to procure 
us felicity," in the words of the lath-century economic theorist 
Galiani--yielded by each outcome, which may vary from person to 
person. Moral expectation was the "mean utility" (emolumenturn 
medium), or product of the utility of each possible outcome and 
its probability [Arrow 1951, 404-4371. 
In order to estimate utility, Bernoulli supposed as the most 
general hypothesis that infinitesimal increments of utility were 
directly proportional to infinitesimal increments in wealth and 
inversely proportional to the amount of the original fortune. 
Thus, the function relating utility to actual wealth would be 
logarithmic. In other words, the richer you are, the more it 
takes to make you happy. In order to apply utility to real 
situations, Bernoulli was obliged to incorporate a theory of 
value into his analysis. He defined wealth as "anything that 
can contribute to the adequate satisfaction of any sort of want," 
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including luxuries. Bernoulli also invoked a possessive theory 
of labor, one in which human labor counted as a commodity or 
possession, to be bought and sold at a market price [Macpherson 
1972, 481. In order for the utility function to be everywhere 
defined, the actual fortune must always be greater than zero: 
dy = b(dx/x) ; dy = increment in utility, 
X = actual or "physical" wealth, 
b = constant of proportionality. 
In order that x be always positive, Bernoulli declared that "there 
is then nobody who can be said to possess nothing at all in this 
sense unless he starves to death. For the great majority the 
most valuable of their possessions so defined will consist in 
their productive capacity" [D. Bernoulli 1954, 331, [3]. 
Bernoulli defended moral expectation with examples designed 
to show that mathematical results derived from this alternative 
definition concurred with sensible conduct and beliefs. Gambling, 
even in fair games, is frowned upon by the prudent. Because of 
the concavity of the utility curve, Bernoulli concluded that 
games of chance judged fair by mathematical expectation--i.e., 
those in which stake equaled expectation--in reality entail 
negative moral expectation for both players: "indeed this is 
Nature's admonition to avoid the dice altogether." Moral ex- 
pectation also sanctioned business decisions which were "univer- 
sally accepted in practice." For example, it is sound practice 
according to computations based on moral expectation to divide 
cargo subject to a uniform risk among several ships. Moreover, 
any man of affairs would endorse the mathematical result derived 
from moral expectation that the advisability of investing in a 
risky venture depended on one's financial resources. 
In Bernoulli's eyes, the strongest confirmation of moral 
expectation came from its resolution of the St. Petersburg 
problem. Since A’s original fortune set an upward limit to the 
moral expectation, A could only risk a finite amount. The utility 
of a gain of 2n-1 ducats relative to A’s original fortune x was 
b log [(x + 2”-1)/x], 
and the moral expectation would be the product of this utility 
and its probability. For the St. Petersburg game, the value of 
A’s opportunity to play would be 
tx + 1)i/2(x + 2)1/4tx + 4)1/e -. . tx + 2n-1)1/2n . . . -x. 
Clearly, the finite value of x severely restricted A’s moral ex- 
pectation. As Bernoulli noted, a fortune of 100 ducats would 
make the gamble worth only 4 ducats; a fortune of 1000 ducats 
248 Lorraine J. Daston HM7 
would raise the price to 6. Hence, moral expectation affirmed 
the reasonable man's reluctance to play the St. Petersburg game 
except for trifling stakes. 
The French mathematician Jean d'Alembert also argued that 
probability theory must explain prudent action in uncertain 
situations, but challenged Daniel Bernoulli's solution to the 
St. Petersburg problem on the grounds that moral expectation, 
while more accurate than mathematical expectation in such cases, 
still oversimplified the actual experience of risk taking. 
D'Alembert accepted Bernoulli's premise that "moral considerations, 
relative to either the fortune of the players, their circumstances, 
their situation, or even their strength" refined the results of 
probability theory, but despaired of quantifying all of these 
factors, or even of ordering the relative importance of these 
diverse variables. 
Moreover, since Bernoulli had failed to specify the rules for 
determining whether mathematical or moral expectation applied in 
a given case, Bernoulli's introduction of moral expectation for 
the St. Petersburg problem seemed suspiciously ad hoc to dIAlem- 
bert [d'Alembert 1784, 5133. For d'Alembert, the St. Peters- 
burg paradox arose from a betrayal of good sense on a different 
front. Whereas Bernoulli believed that the value term of classical 
expectation overestimated the gains, d'Alembert countered that 
it was the probability term which absurdly inflated the expecta- 
tion. Although it might be "mathematically" or "metaphysically" 
possible for a fair coin to turn up tails 100, 1000, or n times 
in a row, experience dismissed such outcomes as "physically" 
impossible. Should such a turn of consecutive tails actually 
occur, d'Alembert claimed that observers would rightly posit some 
underlying, uniform cause, such as an asymmetric coin. Mathe- 
matical probability, which based the postulate of equiprobable 
outcomes on our ignorance of any cause which might tip the balance 
in favor of heads or tails, would therefore no longer apply to 
the situation [Daston 1979, 266-2701. 
D'Alembert often returned to the notion of expectation in 
his critical discussions of mathematical probability. Although 
dissatisfied with Bernoulli's alternative to classical expecta- 
tion, d'Alembert acknowledged the failure of mathematical ex- 
pectation to capture the salient features of reasonable conduct, 
even in simple gambling situations. For example, a lottery with 
an enormous prize, say a million francs, but only a tiny chance 
of winning, say 0.0001, offered an attractive expectation of 100 
francs for each ticket according to the classical formula. Yet 
d'Alembert felt that prudence would counsel against such an in- 
vestment. For d'Alembert, this discrepancy between mathematical 
and psychological expectations pointed to serious flaws in the 
foundation of probability theory. 
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George Leclerc Buffon, while not a mathematician, contributed 
analyses and applications of probability theory in several sections 
of his monumental Histoire naturelle and its supplements [Maistrov 
1974, 118-1231. In his "Essai d'arithm&ique morale," Buffon 
examined the problem of expectation from a primarily psychological 
standpoint. Buffon described a graduated scale of certainties, 
progressing from the "purely intellectual" truths of mathematics 
to physical certainty, founded on an overwhelminy mass of evidence, 
to the far weaker probability of moral certainty, based on an- 
alogical reasoning. Buffon here followed the religious apologists 
Tillotson, Boyle, Wilkins, and Butler in distinguishing types of 
certainty: mathematical, physical, and moral. In the case of 
the lottery example, Buffon maintained that the probability 0.0001 
should be "morally"--though not mathematically or physical-- 
estimated at zero, thereby yielding zero expectation. 
Buffon based his attempts to quantify moral certainty/impos- 
sibility on the assumption that "all fear or hope, whose prob- 
ability equals that which produces the fear of death, in the 
moral realm may be taken as unity against which all other fears 
are to be measured" [Buffon 1777, 561. Because no healthy man 
in the prime of life fears dying in the next twenty-four hours, 
Buffon took the probability of such sudden demise, reckoned from 
the mortality tables, to be about 0.0001, as the zero point 
("moral impossibility") on the scale of moral probability. Buffon 
contended that since no reasonable person gave more than a pass- 
ing thought to the small but discernible probability that he will 
die tomorrow, he must be equally indifferent to the expectation 
produced by a 0.0001 chance of winning the lottery. Indeed, 
Buffon observed, his expectation, while numerically equivalent 
to his risk of imminent death, hardly balances the psychological 
intensity of the latter, "since the intensity of the fear of 
death is a good deal greater than the intensity of any other fear 
or hope." Daniel Bernoulli's approach to expectation had been 
economic, in contrast to the legal inspiration of the classical 
definition; d'Alembert's interpretation turned upon physical 
considerations. Buffon proposed a psychological standard, albeit 
one still linked to reasonable action and belief. Although 
the mortality tables showed that one out of ten thousand people 
actually do die at the height of their powers, the relevant 
measure of probability was the fear or hope such risks evoke in 
the reasonable man under normal conditions. Extremes of in- 
difference or concern calibrated the scale against which straight- 
forward probabilistic computations, such as chances in a fair 
lottery, were to be assessed. 
Buffon advanced his own version of moral expectation in the 
service of the same antigambling sentiments expressed by Daniel 
Bernoulli. As every sober man of affairs knew, all games of 
chance, even so-called fair ones, reduced to "a misconceived 
pact, a contract disadvantageous to both parties." Through 
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mathematical arguments Buffon hoped to succeed where a "vague 
moral discourse" might fail, in curing those rash unfortunates 
who had succumbed to the "epidemic" of gaming. Although Buffon 
accepted Bernoulli's distinction between the utility of equal 
amounts of money for a pauper and a rich man, he posited a linear 
rather than logarithmic relation between utility and original 
fortune: 
Y = xl(a+x), y = utility, 
x = gain, 
a = original fortune. 
Hence, Buffon computed expectation as 
p(xla) - q[xl(x+ all, p = probability of losing, 
q = probability of winning, 
as opposed to the classical expectation of 
P(a - xl - q(a + x). 
Since x/a is always greater than x/(a + x), even if p = q = l/2, 
the expectation of loss always preponderates. Buffon's solution 
to the St. Petersburg problem (which he claimed to have dis- 
covered in 1730, eight years before Bernoulli's memoir, and sent 
to the Swiss mathematician Cramer) faulted conventional expecta- 
tion for not neglecting probabilities less than the 0.0001 value 
for moral impossibility and for tacitly assuming that the amount 
of money was directly proportional to the advantages it brought. 
By correcting these two errors, Buffon claimed to have discovered 
a definition of expectation which "did not fly in the face of 
good sense, and at the same time conformed to experience" [Buffon 
1777, 811. 
Buffon's treatment synthesized Bernoulli's distinction between 
quantity and utility of money (an insight Buffon claimed to have 
achieved independently of Bernoulli's work) and d'Alembert's 
call for a lighter weighting of very small probabilities. For 
Buffon, both of these refinements sprang from the psychology of 
risk taking. The satisfaction which money can buy depended on 
one's threshold of satisfaction; moral probabilities must be 
gauged psychologically, according to the fear or the hope they 
arouse in reasonable men. Even Buffon's notion of value stemmed 
from the psychology of habituation: we need what we are ac- 
customed to having; the more opulent the standard of living, 
the greater the increment needed to make a perceptible improve- 
ment. 
Condorcet's attempt to salvage the classical definition of 
expectation, which he reinterpreted as an average valid only 
over the long run, partook of all three types of "moral" considera, 
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tions--legal, economic, and psychological. Condorcet's interest 
in probability theory was apparently first kindled by d'Alembert's 
critique of the theory. A protege of d'Alembert, Condorcet under- 
took a never-published defense of d'Alembert's views against 
defenders of the conventional theory of mathematical probability. 
Many of his later writings on probability theory, although they 
accepted the major tenets of the theory, reveal the influences 
of d'Alembert's criticisms on Condorcet's philosophical inter- 
pretation of probability in terms of a "motive for belief" [4]. 
In a six-part series of papers published in the M&moires de 
l'Acad6mie des Sciences (1781, 1783, and 17841, Condorcet ad- 
dressed the foundations and applications of the theory with 
special attention "to those results too far removed from those 
given by common reason" [Condorcet 1787, 4561. 
Condorcet conceded that mathematical expectation gave absurd 
results when applied to individual cases, concluding that the 
classical definition held good only for average values. In order 
to substitute these "average" values for the "real" values of 
individual expectation, Condorcet appealed to both jurisprudence 
and political economy. According to Condorcet, there existed 
two possible ways of replacing real values for average ones: 
Woluntaryn (a willing exchange of possible for certain gain), 
and "involuntary" (an unavoidable risk compensated by a certain 
amount). Condorcet admitted that the two cases, which parallel 
the legal categories of voluntary and involuntary contracts, 
do not differ mathematically. In both, an uncertain gain is 
traded for a certain one, or two unequal and unequally probable 
sums are exchanged. However, the two cases were treated separately 
because they involve different conditions for equity, although 
both reduce to the same mathematical conditions. 
Voluntary substitutions provided Condorcet with the meat of 
his analysis. Involuntary substitutions adhered to "the laws of 
equity," since one need only follow "the sum total of similar 
conventions, and seek to arrange matters so that the least 
possible inequality results." In voluntary substitution, "if 
one wishes to act with prudence, if the object is important," 
legal convention guided action only insofar as the two parties 
agreed to a weaker form of equity (une &galit& suffisante) [Con- 
dorcet 1784, 711-7121. Like Bernoulli, Condorcet distinguished 
between the claims of justice and prudence, between the legal 
and the economic spheres. Voluntary substitutions belonged to 
the latter domain, and Condorcet's analysis of these relied 
heavily on the theory of value advanced by his friend and mentor 
Turgot in the latter's Rgflexions sur la formation et la distribu- 
tion des richesses (1766) [Condorcet 1847 5, 42-451. 
Although not an orthodox disciple of the economic doctrines 
of Quesnay, Turgot did accept the physiocratic maxim that in 
exchange, equal value is always traded for equal value. By de- 
fining exchange value as price, the physiocrats turned this 
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precept into a tautology [Sewall 1901, 891. Turqot, however, 
understood the equality between parties to an exchange in psycho- 
logical terms, as a balance of the needs and desires on both 
sides. This balance was tipped in favor of a trade by mutual 
personal interest which raised the psychological valuation of 
the other party's goods above that of one's own goods or money. 
In specific transactions, the value of the goods exchanged had 
no measure other "than the need or desire of the contracting 
parties balanced one against the other and is fixed only by their 
voluntary agreement." However, in the aggregate, the individual 
motives which prompted individual exchanges for similar goods 
tended toward an average price (prix mitoyen) which equalized 
the advantages of buyers and sellers over the long run [Turqot 
1972 2, 552-5531. 
Condorcet's discussion of voluntary substitutions of expecta- 
tions turned upon a comparison between this type of transaction 
and the exchange of goods in "all other markets." In each ex- 
change of expectations, ,in which like commodities have different 
intrinsic values and therefore could not be set rigorously equal, 
there must be a personal or subjective motif de pr&f&ence on 
both sides which impels a trade. Just as the "relation of 
reciprocal needs" established equality among the free agents of 
the marketplace, so in probabilistic expectation, "neither he 
who exchanges a certain value for an uncertain one, or reciprocally, 
nor he who accepts the exchange find in this change any advantage 
independent of the particular motive of convenience which de- 
termined the preference." Averaged over many such exchanges, the 
expectations, like the common price, would tend toward "the 
greatest equality possible" between parties [Condorcet 1784, 7101. 
Condorcet presented the mathematical conditions for a defini- 
tion of expectation satisfying the rules of marketplace exchange: 
over the long run, the most probable outcome should be a net 
loss or gain of zero for both sides; and as the number of cases 
becomes very large, the probability of gain or loss on both sides 
should approach l/2. In other words, expectation should be so 
defined as to give a probability which increases with the number 
of cases that the advantage of either party over the other will 
be smaller than any given amount, or at least less than a quantity 
proportional to the greatest possible advantage. Condorcet 
argued that the classical definition of expectation, conceived 
as an average value, uniquely satisfied these criteria, to offer 
"the greatest possible equality between two essentially different 
conditions." Expectations of individual cases no longer made 
sense in Condorcet's analysis [Condorcet 1789 2, 654-6551. 
Condorcet dismissed the St. Petersburg problem, as originally 
presented, as an "unreal" case, since the probability of zero 
net gain or loss for both sides does not equal l/2 unless the 
game is repeated an infinite number of times. Condorcet then 
turned to cases in which a "reasonable man" might refuse to pay 
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a stake b to win with a probability p, even if b<ap, a being 
the prize; or in which an equally reasonable man might give up b' 
to win a' with a probability p',b'> alp'. In the first case, if 
p is very small and b is large relative to the prospective player's 
total fortune, the revised definition of expectation justified a 
refusal to play, since the stake b would deplete the player's 
resources before he played the game often enough for the average 
expectation to redress his losses. Moreover, since p is very 
small, he would be likely to lose b in any single trial, a sig- 
nificant loss which would deprive him of customary pleasures. 
The second case obtained when both b' and p' were very small, and 
the player thus risked only slight inconvenience. 
Condorcet justified the slight edge, as computed by classical 
expectation, normally accorded the bank in games of chance as just 
compensation for the enormous risks taken and the small margin of 
long-term gains (since the probability of zero net gain or loss 
increases with the number of games played). Gamblers consented 
tothis inequality as the price paid for the pleasure of gambling 
in itself. Entrepreneurs, on the other hand, demanded profits 
greater than those to which mathematical expectation would seem 
to entitle them, since their risks brought no intrinsic pleasure. 
Therefore, in order to have a motif de risquer they must be 
guaranteed a near-certain probability of not losing more than a 
given portion of their investment. Thus, all of the apparent 
contradictions drawn from the everyday conduct of reasonable men 
could be reconciled with expectation viewed as an average, where 
the probability of genuine equality approached certainty as the 
number of trials approached infinity, in accordance with the law 
of large numbers. 
In a seminal paper of 1774, Laplace attacked the St. Peters- 
burg problem in terms closer to the spirit of d'Alembert's analysis, 
using the analytic formulation of what became known as the Bayes- 
Laplace theorem on inverse probabilities which he had developed 
in the same memoir. Laplace accepted d'Alembert's claim that the 
conventional method of computing expectation in the St. Petersburg 
problem unrealistically assumed a perfectly fair coin, "a supposi- 
tion which is only mathematically admissible, because physically 
there must be inequality." To the objection that since both 
players were equally ignorant as to which way the coin was biased 
their respective advantages remained equal, Laplace retorted that 
such specious reasoning simply showed that "the science of hazards 
must be used with caution, and must be modified in passing from the 
mathematical to the physical case" [Laplace 1891 8, 541. Supposing 
that the unknown inequality lay within certain limits, Laplace was 
able to deploy his method of finding inverse probabilities to com- 
pute the "true" expectation. Laplace extended his analysis to the 
case of asymmetric dice, and predicted a whole new genre of such 
problems within the calculus of probabilities. Despite the enthusi- 
asm of d'Alembert and Condorcet for this novel approach, Laplace 
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himself eventually abandoned it in favor of moral expectation, at 
least as far as the St. Petersburg problem was concerned. 
Laplace's magisterial Thgorie analytique des probabilitks 
(1812) systematized all aspects of classical probability theory 
and expanded many in this definitive formulation of that theory. 
In the chapter devoted to moral expectation, Laplace adhered 
closely to Daniel Bernoulli's analysis, citing many of the same 
examples, including the advisability of dividing cargo among as 
many vessels as possible. Laplace noted that in the limit, where 
the number of ships grew very large, moral expectation approached 
mathematical expectation. Laplace solved not only the St. Peters 
burg problem, but also problems pertaining to the relative ad- 
vantages of individual and joint annuities with respect to moral 
(as opposed to physical) fortune. He concluded this section of 
the Th&orie analytique by urging governments to promote such 
schemes, which fostered "the most gentle tendencies of [human] 
nature." Furthermore, they were tainted with none of the hidden 
pitfalls of gambling, which moral expectation exposed as a per- 
petual losing proposition even in fair games and which sober 
reflection condemned. 
Although Laplace advanced these recommendations on the 
strength of results derived from moral expectation, the critiques 
and counterproposals of d'Alembert and others still colored his 
views on the subject. While he clung to Bernoulli's hypothesis 
that the richer one is, the less advantageous a small gain be- 
comes, he warned of the unmanageable complexity of a more com- 
prehensive moral expectation: "But the moral advantage that an 
expected sum can procure depends on an infinity of circumstances 
peculiar to each individual, which are impossible to evaluate" 
[Laplace 1886 7, 4491. 
In his major work on probability theory, Recherches sur la 
probabilite des jugements [1837], Poisson avowed himself a 
disciple of Laplace. Although he questioned several of Laplace's 
assumptions regarding the probability of tribunal decisions, 
Poisson fully accepted Laplace's treatment of moral expectation, 
"which accords with the rules which prudence indicates on the 
manner in which each [individual] should conduct his specula- 
tions" [Poisson 1837, 721. While Poisson's solution to the St. 
Petersburg problem--it is worth noting that a discussion of the 
problem was still de rigeur for probability texts--deviated 
slightly from that of Daniel Bernoulli and Laplace in assuming 
that the critical limiting factor was the bank's, rather than 
the player's, fortune, this variant did not alter the definition 
of moral expectation. Like his predecessors, Poisson believed 
that classical expectation must be supplemented by moral expecta- 
tion in cases of economic deliberation. Moral expectation em- 
bodied the worldly wisdom of the prudent, sober citizen, who 
understood the difference between ruinous games of chance and 
sound investments, despite apparent similarities in the exchange 
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of secure funds for an uncertain prospect of gain. 
Poisson carried forth his work in mathematical probability 
under Laplace's motto that the theory was "only common sense 
reduced to a calculus" to the point of emending Laplace's solu- 
tions under the cover of this cardinal principle [Poisson 1835, 
477-4781. However, Poisson recognized that support for the 
probabilist program in the moral sciences as a guide to rational 
belief and conduct was flagging even among mathematicians. Louis 
Poinsot, for example, attacked Poisson's work on the probability 
of judgments as a "false application of mathematical science." 
Poinsot and Charles Dupin, both Poisson's colleagues in the 
Acaddmie des Sciences, pointed to Laplace's own reticence in 
applying probability theory to situations of such formidable 
complexity [Daston 19801, and warned that the notion of a "calcu- 
lus applicable to those things where insufficient enlightenment, 
ignorance, and human passions were mingled" could constitute an 
invitation to abuse [Poinsot 1836, 3801. 
Although the mathematical approach to the social sciences 
found new support in the work of Adolphe Quetelet, the role of 
mathematical probability in the study of society had changed. 
The 18th-century probabilists had viewed the theory as a descrip- 
tion and guide to social action based upon the example of the 
reasonable man. The dictates of "good sense" supplied the data 
which the calculus of probabilities was to systematize and ex- 
plain. To the extent that good sense was already partially codi- 
fied in jurisprudence and political economy, probabilists found 
it natural to incorporate assumptions and definitions taken from 
these disciplines into the mathematical theory, borrowing sanc- 
tioned by the methods of mixed mathematics. The traffic between 
mathematical probability and the moral sciences was especially 
heavy in cases where the mathematical results were at odds with 
reasonable opinion. With the exception of d'Alembert, 18th- 
century mathematicians did not believe that the complexity of 
the moral realm, as it was reflected in the psychology of deci- 
sion making, posed insuperable obstacles to the probabilist 
program. 
However, the upheaval of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic era 
appears to have shaken the confidence of the probabilists in a 
way in which d'Alembert's persistent criticisms had not. The 
conduct of reasonable men no longer seemed an obvious standard, 
nor a comprehensive basis for a theory of society. Distinguishing 
prudent from rash behavior in post-1789 France was no easy matter, 
and just what constituted social rationality was no longer self- 
evident. With the demise of the reasonable man, probabilists lost 
both their subject matter and their criterion for valid solutions. 
Laplace and Poisson marked the transition from this 18th- 
century probabilist program to the more statistical orientation 
of Quetelet. Despite his use of moral expectation, Laplace was 
notably reluctant to extend this sort of analysis further. Laplace 
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did not wholly abandon hopes for a "social mathematics," but he 
did direct his followers toward a different metric of society, 
statistics. Instead of making the conduct and opinions of 
reasonable men their subject, probabilists focused on compila- 
tions of facts about other aspects of society, such as the annual 
rates of conviction in civil and criminal courts published by the 
French Ministry of Justice [5]. Applied to these data, probability 
theory would reveal the universal laws governing social phenomena. 
Quetelet still envisioned probability theory as a mathematical 
description of society, but understood society to be an aggre- 
gate of all behavior, reasonable or not, catalogued in the bur- 
geoning store of statistics. By sorting through this mass of 
data, probabilists would uncover macroscopic regularities about 
social processes such as crime rate and population growth. 
The l%th-century probabilists had concentrated on the psy- 
chology of the rational individual; Quetelet insisted that prob- 
ability theory made it possible to neglect individuals entirely, 
since they exerted "little or no force on the mass," the level 
at which he expected laws to emerge [Quetelet 1835 1, 4-51. For 
19th-century probabilists, the emphasis shifted from the measure 
of expectation to the study of distributions. Although both 
schools stressed the special fitness of probability theory as a 
mathematical tool for the study of society, the objectives and 
content of the social sciences were conceived in wholly different 
ways. 
Moreover, criticisms leveled at the applications of probability 
theory to problems in the moral sciences, like those of Poinsot 
and Dupin, tended to drive a wedge between the mathematical theory 
itself and its more suspect applications. Thus the lath-century 
category of mixed mathematics gave way to a dichotomy between pure 
and applied mathematics in the modern sense, at least as far as 
the "art of conjecture" was concerned. Although Poinsot, for 
example, attacked the probability of judgments as an "aberration 
of the intellect," he carefully exempted the mathematical theory 
of probability per se from this stricture, acknowledging that it 
was just as accurate as arithmetic. What Poinsot and others 
protested was a "false application" of the theory, suggesting a 
new awareness of the autonomy of mathematical probability from 
its applications. 
I have argued that the lath-century probabilists tailored the 
mathematical theory to fit the prescriptions of what was deemed 
to be rational conduct. They repeatedly rejected mathematical 
methods which contradicted the promptings of reasonableness, but 
reasonableness was by no means a constant, admitting numerous 
interpretations. Legal, economic, physical, and psychological 
refinements were all proposed as adjustments to the mathematical 
theory in the name of good sense. The competing orientations of 
jurisprudence and political economy created rival definitions 
of political economy, and psychological and physical considera- 
tions further complicated the issue. 
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Only d'Alembert suggested that the social reality might elude 
the sort of description sought by the probabilists altogether, 
and even his criticisms shared their assumptions, if not their 
optimism. Like his colleagues, d'Alembert believed that "social 
mathematics" would ideally be a mathematical model of the way 
in which reasonable men made decisions. Although Laplace and 
Poisson retained many elements of the good-sense approach to 
probability, they also appealed to a statistical description of 
society which Quetelet made the cornerstone of his "social physics.' 
Probabilists no longer cross-checked their results against the 
practices and beliefs of "men known for their experience and 
wisdom in the conduct of their affairs" [Lacroix 1816, 2571, and 
mathematical probability ceased to be known as the "art of con- 
jecture." 
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NOTES 
1. Domat was among the foremost French jurists of his time, 
and a close friend of Pascal. Like other members of the natural 
law school, Domat endorsed probabilistic standards of legal proof 
[Foirers 1965, 169-1921. 
2. For a detailed account of this philosophical program and 
its impact on natural philosophy, see: Baker [1975, Part 31, 
Shapiro 11969, 727-7661, and Waldman [1959, 299-3161. 
3. Nicholas Bernoulli had also proposed the problem to Cramer, 
who had responded in a 1728 letter (quoted by Daniel Bernoulli) 
with a similar analysis. Although Cramer also distinguished be- 
tween wealth and utility, he set utility proportional to the 
square root of monetary value. 
4. In an unpublished manuscript [Condorcet Bibliothsque 
de 1'Institut MS 875, ff. 93-941, Condorcet made use of d'Alem- 
bert's distinction between "physical" and "metaphysical" possi- 
bilities to derive three mutually contradictory results for a 
problem of the St. Petersburg type. 
5. These Comptes g.h&raux de l'administration de la justice 
were first published in 1825, and greatly influenced the work of 
Poisson and Quetelet. 
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